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ABSTRACT: Artifact metrics is an information security technology that uses the intrinsic 
characteristics of a physical object for authentication and clone resistance. Here, we 
demonstrate nano-artifact metrics based on silicon nanostructures formed via an array of 
resist pillars that randomly collapse when exposed to electron-beam lithography. The 
proposed technique uses conventional and scalable lithography processes, and because of 
the random collapse of resist, the resultant structure has extremely fine-scale morphology 
with a minimum dimension below 10 nm, which is less than the resolution of current 
lithography capabilities. By evaluating false match, false non-match and clone-resistance 
rates, we clarify that the nanostructured patterns based on resist collapse satisfy the 
requirements for high-performance security applications.  
 
 
Artifact metrics1 uses physical features unique to individual objects in terms of their physical 
properties or combinations of these properties, including electromagnetic2,3, mechanical and 
optical properties4,5. For an artifact metric to function, it should satisfy several conditions, such 
as (1) the extracted characters should vary between individual objects (individuality), (2) a given 
response should be consistently obtained for each measurement (measurement stability), (3) they 
should be robust against degradation caused by common use (durability) and (4) fabricated 
clones having an equivalent physical characteristic should be extremely difficult (clone 
resistance). Examples of existing artifact metrics include ordinary paper5, paper containing 
magnetic microfibers6, plastics and semiconductor chips. A physical unclonable function7 is a 
type of artifact metrics that is essentially equivalent to what Matsumoto et al. examined under 
the name of ‘clone-resistant modules’ in 19978.  
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The critical-security battlefield in which artifact metrics are used is analogous to a 
defender and attacker relationship in which the former tries to produce patterns that are difficult 
copies, and the latter seeks to counterfeit these patters. In view of recent technological 
advancements in microfabrication and its strong demand in society and industry (e.g. optical 
document security9), new technology must go beyond that developed so far, which has been 
limited to micrometre-scale precision, and be founded on the ultimate principles of physics. 
Here, we propose and demonstrate a nano-artifact metrics that is robust against cloning attacks. 
The proposed metric uses nanometre-scale structures obtained from the random collapse of 
resists induced by exposure to conventional electron-beam (e-beam) lithography.  
E-beam lithography is a mature and fundamental technology for prototyping fine 
structures. Minimum feature size is an important metric for lithography to produce the 
designated structures. To quantify the achievable minimum size, we use a two-dimensional array 
of pillars. The decrease in the minimum pitch of a pillar array over the last few years is 
summarized in Fig. 1a. The circles denoted (1), (2) and (3) in Fig. 1a are based on Refs. [10], 
[11] and [12], respectively and the dotted line, which represents an estimated pitch-resolution 
limit, is based on Refs. [13] and [14]. Figure 1a also suggests that these feature sizes may be 
fabricated by attackers who use the available technology to make clones. 
Meanwhile, we must also consider the extent to which we can precisely measure fine 
structures with the available technology such as a scanning electron microscopy (SEM). Critical-
dimension scanning electron microscopy (CD-SEM), which is specialized in measuring length 
and offers precision in the sub-nanometre scale, may be assumed15. For an artifact metrics to be 
made using silicon nanostructures fabricated based on conventional e-beam lithography, the 
defender, who wants to prevent counterfeiting, must fabricate fine-structured patterns such that 
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the attacker, who wants to copy the authentic device, will not be able to intentionally reproduce 
the pattern based on the information obtained by CD-SEM. However, this condition imposes a 
paradoxical requirement that fine structures which are smaller than the resolution limit of the 
state-of-the-art e-beam lithography should be fabricated. Otherwise, the authentic devices may 
be easily cloned.  
To overcome this paradox, we exploit the well-known phenomenon of the random 
collapse of resist16. Resist collapse may occur during the rinse process of lithography and 
depends on the pattern resolution, resist thickness and duration of e-beam exposure. The end 
result is the collapse of the intended pattern16. To produce a desired pattern, resist collapse must 
be suppressed in e-beam lithography, which can be achieved by deployment of ‘anticollapse 
rinses’. However, from the standpoint of nano-artifact metrics, resist collapse occasionally 
provides structures finer than the original technological limitation. Furthermore, resist collapse 
occurs randomly. Therefore, as shown in Fig. 1a, we can use resist collapse to benefit from the 
uncertainty in position that is less than the resolution of nanofabrication and achieve nano-
artifact-metric functionalities.  
To verify this notion, we fabricated an array of pillars from a layer of resist. The pillars 
had cross section area of 60 nm   60 nm, were 200 nm high and were positioned on a grid of 
120 nm × 120 nm squares that filled a 2 m × 2 m square, as shown in Fig. 1b. As a guide for 
facilitating alignment, a 3 m × 3 m square frame was drawn outside the pillar array area. We 
used a JEOL JBX-9300FS e-beam lithography system with the acceleration voltage set at 100 kV 
and with a dose of 37 C/cm2. After post-exposure bake and resist development, the structure is 
rinsed, which is when the random collapse of resist pillars occurs. Figure 1c shows an SEM 
image of an array of collapsed resist pillars. The wafer is then etched with HBr-based gas using 
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inductively coupled plasma (ICP)-type reactive ion etching (RIE), and the resist is stripped by 
oxygen ashing. The resulting nanostructured-silicon patterns were imaged by a CD-SEM 
(Hitachi High-Technologies CG4000). We fabricated 2401 samples on a single 200-mm-diamter 
wafer and used 2383 of these samples to evaluate their use for security applications.  
Figure 2a shows an image of a nanostructured-silicon pattern. The image contains 1024 × 
1024 pixels, has eight-bit resolution (256 levels) and was obtained by averaging eight frames 
acquired by CD-SEM. A variety of different morphologies were obtained, as shown in Fig. 2b. 
Figures 2b.i and 2b.iii show that the structural details in the patterns are as small as 9.23 nm.  
Here, one minor remark is that the sizes and the layout of the original array of pillars have 
not been optimized so that the resultant security performances, described below, are maximized. 
Nevertheless, as shortly demonstrated, quite good properties have been obtained. This indicates 
that further advancements could be possible by engineering the original pillar (or not-like-a-
pillar) structures to be collapsed, which could be an interesting future study. Meanwhile, we have 
experimentally confirmed that a proper dose of electron beam is necessary in order to induce 
versatile collapse of resist pillars; Figs. 2c and 2d show CD-SEM images when the dose was 30 
and 40 C/cm2, respectively, indicating that too low or too high doses do not yield versatile 
resultant patterns.  
To determine whether these patterns may be used as artifact metrics, we conducted the 
following analysis: A 512 pixel × 512 pixel, 8 bit (256 levels) greyscale image was extracted 
from the centre of an image of a pillar array and smoothed by an 11 11  median filter. In 
comparing any two patterns, ( , )A i j  and ( , )B i j , we first created a ‘mask’ pattern defined by  
1, ( , )  or ( , )
( , )
0 otherwise,
A i j T B i j T
M i j
                                                                         (1) 
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where T is a given threshold value. Because the patterns are fabricated by conventional 
lithographic processes, they consist of areas of varying heights. Therefore, two peaks appear in 
the statistics of pixel values, with a valley between the two peaks. Specifically, the number of 
times higher and lower peak values occur was approximately 130 and 80, respectively, and the 
incidence of the valley (i.e. the threshold T) between the two peaks was 90. Here, a remark is that 
the pixel value in images is given by 8 bit (0–255), and the particular values of 130, 80 and 90 
are related to the greyscale pixel values of the given images. As indicated by Fig. 1c and Fig. 2, 
the greyscale value is related to the height of the nanostructured pattern. We do not calibrate the 
pixel value to the actual height (i.e. ( , )A i j  and ( , )B i j  are dimensionless values), but it does not 
cause any problem in this particular study. Also, 1 pixel occupies approximately a 3.3 nm square 
area.  
By applying the mask, we obtain two images, ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( , )A i j M i j A i j   and 
ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( , )B i j M i j B i j  , which means that we ignore regions where both patterns ( , )A i j  and 
( , )B i j are low (i.e. the pattern is not high). The correlation, or similarity, between the two 
patterns is evaluated by the Pearson correlation coefficient  
2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )
,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )
i j
i j
A i j A B i j B
R
A i j A B i j B
         
         


                                                                      (2) 
where Aˆ  and Bˆ  indicate the average of ˆ( , )A i j  and ˆ( , )B i j , respectively. R is a dimensionless 
value. If R is negative, it is set to zero. Furthermore, each value of ( , )A i j  and ( , )B i j  is shifted 
between one and five pixels to the upper, lower, left and right side, and R is calculated for each 
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shifted position. The maximum R from these positions (no shift, left, right, up and down shifts) is 
used as the similarity between ( , )A i j  and ( , )B i j .  
We next calculate the false match rate (FMR) and false non-match rate (FNMR). FMR 
and FNMR are indicators of individuality and measurement stability, respectively. To calculate 
the FMR, all 2383 images were used. If the similarity given by Eq. (2) is greater than the given 
threshold, the two patterns are considered to be similar to each other, which is extremely likely to 
be a false decision. Since we had 2383 samples, we conducted 2383   2382 comparisons in 
calculating the FMR for threshold values between 0 and 1. To have an intuitive picture, suppose 
that only 1 case among the 2383   2382 comparisons resulted in a false decision. In this case, 
the ‘error rate’ would be 71/ (2383 2382) 1.76 10   . From such calculation, the logarithmic 
scale for the FMR in the y-axis of Fig. 3 is naturally recognized. From Fig. 3, the FMR drops 
below the error rate of 10−6 as the threshold is just above zero, indicating that the occurrence of 
false decisions among all comparisons are extremely small.  
To calculate the FNMR, we used images created from 100 images of each of the 74 
samples. If the similarity is less than the given threshold, the two images are considered different 
from each other. In other words, identical samples are considered different, which is a false 
decision. The leftmost and rightmost curves in Fig. 3 show the FMR and FNMR, respectively. 
The FMR is substantially smaller than the FNMR, even with a smaller threshold value. In 
addition, the FMR and FNMR curves are well separated from each other, which means that it is 
possible to obtain sufficiently small FMR and FNMR by choosing adequate threshold values.  
In addition, using the following method, we examined the clone match rate (CMR). 
Suppose that attackers capture the authentic device pattern and precisely fabricate a pattern in 
such a manner that an average over every k k  pixel area is essentially equivalent to the 
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authentic device pattern. To quantify such a cloning process, we transformed each of the 2383 
images into ‘virtually cloned images’. Let the pixel value for a k k  area be denoted by ( , )p i j . 
If the average value in this area is greater than the threshold T, we consider this area to have the 
higher average value (130). Thus, this pixel value of the virtually cloned image is '( , ) 130p i j  . 
If the average value in the k k  area is less than or equal to the threshold T, we consider this 
area to have the lower average value (80). Thus, this pixel value of the virtually cloned image is 
'( , ) 80p i j  . The clone image thus obtained is then compared with the authentic image using Eq. 
(2). If the similarity exceeds the threshold value, the clone successfully mimics the original. The 
CMR is calculated by performing the above evaluation for all the 2383 samples.  
This scheme constitutes a very strict evaluation of the cloning resistance. Table 1 
summarizes the assumed cloning technologies. For example, if k = 3, a 3 3  pixel area (or ‘unit 
tile size’) corresponds to a 10 nm × 10 nm square because, as mentioned earlier, 1 pixel occupies 
approximately a 3.3 nm square area, which may be regarded as state-of-the-art for the current 
nanofabrication technology. Nevertheless, the similarity cannot be greater than 0.4, as indicated 
by the calculated CMR shown by the purple dotted curve in Fig. 3. Considering that this value is 
considerably lower than the similarity between images of identical samples (i.e. the FNMR 
curve), such a clone does not pose a serious threat. In other words, the original authentic pattern 
is sufficiently random. Furthermore, were it possible to detect that a given pattern was formed 
from a combination of square units, it would presumably be determined that, based on such a 
feature, the pattern is a non-authentic device (or clone); this strategy is similar to liveness 
detection in biometrics17. Finally, note that the signal processing scheme described above is 
relatively simple yet requires highly skilled attackers. Based on these considerations and the 
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results of the FMR, FNMR and CMR analysis, we conclude that the proposed nanostructured 
patterns based on the random collapse of resist could serve as superior nano-artifact metrics.  
Finally, we put forward few remarks on the demonstrated principles and technologies.  
First, the proposed principle is based on the ‘uncertainty’ inherent in conventional e-beam 
lithography technologies. Moreover, e-beam lithography is one of the widely spreading 
nanotechnologies including silicon fabrications. In this context, the proposed principle also has 
advantages in its general purpose properties or utilities.  
Second is a comment regarding optical lithography. Optical lithography in silicon 
nanostructring is based on the so-called reticle, which is subjected to reduced-projection 
exposure. A reticle is four times larger in scale than the intended nanostructured pattern and is 
fabricated by e-beam lithography. It is impossible to fabricate patterns by optical lithography in 
the same resolution of the randomly collapsed silicon nanostructures demonstrated in this study. 
In other words, optical lithography may not be useful for attackers in copying the demonstrated 
devices. 
The third remark concerns the term ‘nano-artifact metrics’. In Ref. [1], Matsumoto et al. 
proposed ‘artifact metrics’. The notion of artifact metrics is conceptually similar to ‘biometrics’, 
for which uniqueness in biological entities is utilized. Unlike biometrics, artifact metrics utilizes 
uniqueness in physical objects/things, physical processes or their combinations. We should 
emphasize that there are no implications such as ‘defective patterns’ in the word ‘artifact’. One 
may imagine that ‘nanoscale fingerprint’ might be more appropriate than ‘nano-artifact metrics’. 
However, the term ‘fingerprint’ implies information hiding, watermarking and their related 
technologies in the field of information security, which do not apply to our study. Furthermore, 
as discussed at the beginning of this paper, we showed four important requirements for artifact 
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metrics to function (i.e. individuality, measurement stability, durability, clone resistance). Here, 
it should be noted that a total system as a whole is important, not just the elemental processes; 
this is another reason we describe the concept by ‘nano-artifact metrics’, which includes the 
notion of a total system while avoiding the use of ‘nanoscale fingerprint’.  
In summary, with the goal of exploiting the fundamental laws of physics to produce 
nano-artifact metrics, we demonstrated nano-artifact metrics based on the random collapse of 
resist pillars in e-beam lithography. As qualitative significance for information security, this 
study opens new design principles and degrees-of-freedom by exploiting uncertainty at the 
nanometre scale. Moreover, by developing sophisticated image preprocessing means and 
similarity indices for matching, the security performance of these metrics is further enhanced. 
This is also a qualitatively novel aspect for information security in the sense that the 
combinations of physical process and logical signal processing means provide new values. Note 
that our use of SEM technology is not a particularly important aspect of this study. To construct 
practical systems, many additional issues must be considered, such as reducing measurement 
cost and verifying interoperability for the case when different measurement devices are used for 
sample registration and authentication. Nevertheless, this study demonstrates that sufficiently 
good security performance can be achieved by the random collapse of resist in e-beam 
lithography; the enemy of silicon processing in previous studies turns out to be a strong enabler 
for information security in this study.  
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Table 1 |Assumptions for cloning technology.  
 
Unit tile size of virtual clone image Actual physical size 
15 15  pixels 50-nm-square 
12 12  pixels 40-nm-square 
9 9  pixels 30-nm-square 
6 6  pixels 20-nm-square 
3 3  pixels 10-nm-square 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1 | Nano-artifact metrics based on random collapse of resist in electron-beam 
lithography. (a) Roadmap showing the minimum size of pillars formed by e-beam 
lithography. Using the phenomenon of randomly induced resist collapse, nano-artifact 
metrics contain length scales below the minimum dimension available in conventional 
lithography methods. (b) Schematic of array of pillars. (c) SEM image of collapsed resist.  
 
Figure 2 | Versatile morphology in silicon nanostructures obtained from collapsed resist. (a) 
Example of entire region of fabricated silicon nanostructure. (b) Magnified view of 
several areas from the panel (a). The minimum feature size is indicated in each image. 
Note that feature sizes are smaller than the minimum feature size of the original array of 
pillars. In other words, the uncertainty obtained in this versatile morphology is less than 
that available directly by current technology. (c,d) Silicon nanostructure when the dose 
quantity in the e-beam lithography was (c) 30 and (d) 40 C/cm2, respectively. Too low 
or too high doses do not yield versatile resultant patterns. 
 
Figure 3 | Evaluation of security performance. Error rate as a function of the threshold. False 
match rate (FMR) and false non-match rate (FNMR) are labelled. The curves labelled 60, 
50, 40, 30, 20 and 10 nm are the clone match rate (CMR) for the given minimum unit tile 
size.  
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